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THE NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT:
AN INEFFECTIVE STEP IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION
Since 1909, the number of cities with at least two competing news-
papers has sharply declined.' Many newspapers have been forced to
suspend operations, switch to weekly publication, or merge with their
competitor. This situation is primarily the result of social and economic
developments since the turn of the century which have increasingly
centered control of the newspaper industry in fewer and fewer hands.'
As a result, the number of diverse and independent editorial voices
available to the public has been greatly reduced.
To counter the forces which have left many cities with only one
newspaper, joint newspaper operating arrangements were developed.
Their purpose was twofold; (1) to reduce operating costs by combin-
ing the business aspects of newspaper production,' and (2) to maintain
editorial and reportorial independence. For nearly a third of a century,
these arrangements encountered no government opposition. However,
in 1965, the Department of Justice instituted an action against a joint
newspaper operating arrangement in Tucson, Arizona. This action cul-
minated in a Supreme Court decision that the arrangement was a
violation of the antitrust laws. 4 In response to this ruling, and in an
effort to protect existing and future arrangements of this type, the
Newspaper Preservation Act was passed to grant limited antitrust
exemption to the newspaper industry.
1 In 1909, 689 cities had competing newspapers, but by 1968 this number had fallen
to 50. Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 319, 319-
20 (1968). In 1910, 6 out of 10 cities with newspapers had at least 2 newspapers. By
1960, this had become less than 2 out of 10. Today, 5 cities have 3 or more newspapers;
37 have 2 separately owned papers. Statement of Arthur B. Hanson, General Counsel,
American Newspaper Publishers Association, Hearings on 5.1312 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 43 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 5.1312J.
2 Among the factors contributing to declining competition, the most notable are: (1)
a decline in the partisanship of the American press—few newspapers are started and kept
alive for political reasons; (2) a growth in objective reporting which has created similarity
among newspapers—in an effort to increase circulation, publishers strive to be as inoffen-
sive as possible, and this is most effectively accomplished by objectivity; (3) the growth
of the suburbs, which has stabilized the total number of newspapers by creating numerous
one-newspaper towns while competition in the industry declines; (4) the growing com-
petition from other media; and (5) the desire of advertisers for larger circulation. See
Roberts, supra note 1, at 320-21, 328-30, 355.
a This includes joint printing, distribution, clerical and administrative staffs, adver-
tising departments, and allocation of markets.
4 In Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the Court held
that the agreement violated antitrust prohibitions against price fixing under 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964), monopolization under 15 U.S.C. * 2 (1964), and unlawful merger under 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1964). Id, at 135-37. The parties involved were the Citizens Publishing Co., Arden
Publishing Co., and their jointly created and jointly owned company, Tucson News-
papers, Inc., which managed all the business departments of both papers except the news
and editorial units.
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It is the purpose of this comment to examine the nature of joint
newspaper operating arrangements and their rejection by the Supreme
Court. The legislative response to the situation, the Newspaper Pres-
ervation Act,° will then be considered with special emphasis on the
antitrust and constitutional questions which may be raised by its
enactment.
I. JOINT NEWSPAPER OPERATING ARRANGEMENTS
Newspapers must compete in two areas at the same time; (1)
editorially and reportorially, and (2) commercially for increased ad-
vertising and circulation. Both aspects are interrelated by a unique
chain of interdependence. To compete effectively editorially and re-
portorially, a newspaper must staff these departments with talented
personnel. This requires substantial funds to meet wage and salary
demands. Within the newspaper industry, the primary source of these
funds is the sale of advertising.° Competition for advertising depends
upon circulation since advertising prices are not based upon a flat rate
per line, but on a charge for reaching a million readers with that line.'
Since advertising charges generally increase at a much slower rate than
circulation size,' the net effect is that the more readers a newspaper
has, the lower its cost per line to the advertiser. Thus, a paper with
greater circulation sales is usually more attractive to advertisers than
smaller newspapers.
However, due to the parochial content° of most papers, and the
transportation problems involved in distribution, circulation is usually
confined to the immediate metropolitan region, and the likelihood of
expanding sales by enlarging the area of distribution is not good. As a
result, the size of a newspaper's circulation is directly related to the
population of the community in which it is located. The importance
of this market factor is readily apparent to competing publications
faced with rising production costs which create a need for increased
advertising revenue. Since it is unlikely that the size of the market
will grow, a publication with a smaller circulation size than its com..
petitor usually faces a desperate situation." The smaller paper must
5 Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (July 24, 1970).
OSeventy-five percent of a newspaper's revenue comes from advertising. The remain-
ing 25% comes from sales to its readers. 116 Cong. Rec. S864 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Inouye).
7 This is referred to as the "milline rate." Roberts, supra note 1, at 324.
8 Barber, Newspaper Monopoly in New Orleans: The Lesson for Antitrust Policy,
24 La. L. Rev. 503, 509-10.
O With the exception of publications such as the Wall Street Journal and The New
York Times, most newspapers must satisfy the public interest in local news at the com-
munity level. A paper cannot provide news events from too many communities without
inadequately reporting that news or publishing a near book-size issue to inform the
public properly. Thus, most newspapers are restricted to their immediate metropolitan
area and most are read primarily by people in or near the city of publication. Id. at 540.
10 It is estimated that as the population of an area of distribution falls below
650,000, newspaper competition is nearly non-existent. Id. at 541.  	 ,
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increase its circulation size within a fixed market, but this requires the
hiring of more talented personnel and establishing a more effective and
efficient distribution system, thus presenting additional costs to the
newspaper. These expenses must be met by an increase in advertising
revenue, which in turn requires an increased circulation size. This
circular dilemma has created a very serious problem. While the num-
ber of newspapers being published has remained relatively stable since
1945,11
 owing to the growth of the suburbs and the resultant one-
newspaper towns, there has been a dangerous decline in the number
of competing, diverse and independent editorial points of view available
to the public."
To meet the declining competition in the newspaper industry,
joint newspaper operating arrangements were developed.' Under this
system, competing newspapers, cognizant of the market's inability to
support them both individually, unite commercially in an effort to
maintain editorial independence. Essentially, the parties to the arrange-
ment create a jointly owned company to handle the printing, advertis-
ing and distribution requirements of both papers. In this way, the
costs of unnecessary duplication are avoided and, by virtue of the
sharing of advertising revenues, financial benefit accrues to the weaker
partner. Consequently, notwithstanding economic conditions incapable
of supporting more than one newspaper in a particular area, the public
may still receive the benefit of diverse and independent editorial
voices.'
II. ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
For over 30 years federal enforcement agencies, aware of these
arrangements, were not concerned with their effects in the area of
antitrust." Of the few proceedings instituted against newspapers by
the Department of Justice prior to 1965, none were brought for un-
lawful merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act," nor were any
brought for monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act." That is, the mere existence of a joint operating arrangement-
11 The total number of daily newspapers has remained relatively stable at 1750.
Statement of Bryce W. Rucker, Professor of Journalism, Southern Illinois University,
Hearings on S. 1312, supra note I, at 282.
12 See note 1 supra.
18 The first joint newspaper operating arrangement was formed in 1933 in Albu-
querque, New Mexico, The parties there involved were The Journal Publishing Co., The
New Mexico State Tribune, and The Albuquerque Publishing Co. In the period from
1933 until 1966, 22 joint arrangements were put into operation in 19 states. 1970
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2927.
14 From the production standpoint, a large portion of a newspaper's costs is incurred
in getting the paper ready for •print. Once the type is set and the presses are ready it
makes little difference, in terms of production costs, how many copies are printed. Barber,
supra •note .8, at 539.
15
 116 Cong. Rec. S862 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
16 15 U.S.C.	 18 (1964).
17
 15 U.S.C. 1 2 (1964).
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though monopolistic in structure—did not result in antitrust litigation.
Prosecutions were only for allegations of improper market conduct"
—prosecutions for monopolistic practices, as opposed to prosecutions
for being a monopoly. This may result partly because statutory stan-
dards are phrased in terms suggesting monopolistic practices," or pos-
sibly because antitrust officials generally felt that it was easier to win
a case involving improper conduct than one which challenged a domi-
nant market position.2° Another suggested reason for the emphasis on
market conduct is that the Department of Justice felt that if illicit
exclusionary tactics were curtailed, normal market forces would allow
most cities to maintain at least two competing newspapers," and, even
if the desired competition was still not realized, there was no need
for government interference since, historically, it was felt that the
antitrust laws should not interfere with anyone "who merely by su-
perior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody
could do it as well."22
Distinct changes in antitrust enforcement have occurred in the
last 25 or .30 years, however, and market power, though legitimate in
itself, is no longer tolerated if it raises barriers to the growth or entry
of competition.23 Notwithstanding the transition of emphasis in anti-
trust enforcement during this period, suits by the Department of
Justice against newspapers did not reflect this change, and joint op-
erating arrangements continued without challenge for nearly a third
of a century. 24 Since antitrust officials have a good deal of discretion
with respect to the kinds of cases they prosecute, and similar discre-
tion as to the business area within which to prosecute them, 28 they may
have ignored the newspaper industry so as to avoid the sensitive area
of government regulation of the press. The constitutional shadow which
the First Amendment casts over the newspaper industry may have
caused enforcement officials to question their chances for successfully
prosecuting offending publications. And since there is simply not
enough money to prosecute every possible case, the authorities gen-
erally institute proceedings which provide a reasonable certainty of
18 E.g., prosecutions were usually for forced combination rates to advertisers, United
States v. The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670 (ED. La. 1952), rev'd
on other grounds, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); The Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240
F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957); and for the use of exclusionary tactics, United States v. Harte-
Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Texas 1959); United States v. Lorain
journal Co., 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
1 D C. Kaysen and D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 240 (1959).
25 See Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States,
62 Marv. L. Rev. 1265, 1284 (1949).
21 Barber, supra note 8, at 505.
22 21 Cong. Rec. 3146-152, as quoted in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953).
25 This was the key issue in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
24 See text at note 15 supra.
25 Mason, supra note 20, at 1284.
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success in order to realize a return on their investment of time, per-
sonnel and resources."
However, in 1964, the Department of Justice began an inves-
tigation which culminated in an action against the parties to a joint
newspaper operating arrangement in Tucson, Arizona." In Citizens
Publishing Co. v. United States,28 the Supreme Court held that a joint
operating arrangement between Tucson's only two daily newspapers
of general circulation, The Star and The Citizen, constituted a price
fixing, profit pooling and market control agreement, unlawful per se
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act," monopolization in violation of
Section 2 of that Act," and an unlawful merger prohibited by Section
7 of the Clayton Act.' The Court emphasized that it was not con-
demning all forms of joint operation and, as a result, allowed the
parties to the Tucson arrangement to modify their agreement so as to
eliminate the price fixing, profit pooling and market control provisions.
The Court required the newspapers to reestablish themselves as in-
dependent commercial competitors to avoid the unlawful merger aspect
of their agreement. Thus, at the heart of the Court's opinion was an
objection to joint advertising and circulation agreements which pre-
vented commercial competition between the parties. 82
However, the per se application of antitrust law in Citizens Pub-
lishing Co. to curb the evils of newspaper monopolies was an ineffec-
tive approach to the problem. Since the real cause of newspaper
monopolies is the interdependence of circulation, advertising revenue,
rising costs and the restrictions imposed by a stable market size,
mechanical application of the antitrust laws actually assists the trend
of declining competition. Considering the dual competitive character-
istic of the newspaper industry, the joint operating arrangements re-
move commercial competition to prolong editorial and reportorial
competition. Application of the antitrust laws would require the parties
to the arrangement either to separate, which would financially destroy
the weaker member and remove its editorial voice from the community,
26 Id. at n.44.
27 See note 4 supra.
28 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
22 15 U.S.C. p 1 (1964).
80 15 U.S.C.	 2 (1964).
81 II U.S.C. II 18 (1964).
82 The case was remanded to the district court in order that the parties might
modify the joint agreement to conform to the Supreme Court order. Reflecting that
decision, the Department of Justice and the parties to the Tucson arrangement, under
the supervision of the district court, resolved that the arrangement could do the follow-
ing: (1) jointly use mechanical facilities; (2) share a joint circulation system, but each
paper must maintain its own personnel; (3) publish a joint Sunday newspaper; (4)
share a single business department with separate bookkeeping and billing; and (5) set up
a joint rate structure permitting the sales force on both papers to establish a cost justified
combination rate, but again, each paper , must supply its own personnel. Note the
emphasis on the advertising and circulation provisions that each paper be represented by
its own people. (Other parts of the arrangement not relevant to this discussion are
omitted.) 116 Cong. Rec. S874-78 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970).
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or merge completely, which would also remove an editorial voice. Thus,
the competitive efficiencies of large circulation size, particularly in
light of its interaction with advertising revenue, indicate that the
natural economic forces which are primarily responsible for newspaper
monopolies are beyond the control of antitrust enforcement.
In Citizens Publishing Co., the parties to the joint newspaper
operating arrangement argued that the judicially created "failing com-
pany" doctrine provided a defense to their commercial merger." This
doctrine, traditionally applied as a defense only under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act," was first articulated in International Shoe Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission." There, the Supreme Court held that a merger
between competitors is permitted if one of the companies is failing and
can no longer be a vital competitive factor in the market. But the
Citizens Publishing Co. Court held that the merger did not comply
with the "failing company" doctrine since it was not shown that the
Star was the only party interested in acquiring the Citizen, nor that
the Citizen was unlikely to be successfully revitalized." It is in this
regard that the Court departed from its International Shoe holding and
other "failing company" doctrine decisions because of its apparent
rejection of the notion that the "failing company" is a single criterion
exemption from antitrust. Earlier cases held that the defense was
satisfied by showing that the acquired company was failing," but
Citizens Publishing Co. held that it must also be shown that the com-
petitor was the only available purchaser, and that there was no pos-
sibility for the successful reorganization of the acquired company. 88
However, the application of the "failing company" test of hopeless
insolvency, imminent receivership, and the absence of any purchaser
other than the competitor cannot meet the needs of the newspaper
industry. Because of the interdependence of circulation, advertising,
and news and editorial quality, a newspaper could never be revitalized
if it met the "failing company" sanctions. This is because a newspaper
has no merchandise or inventory to offer another paper contemplating
a merger or purchase." All a newspaper can really offer a prospective
buyer is its circulation which provides a base for acquiring advertising
revenue. If a newspaper is judged as other industries under the "failing
company" doctrine, its financial resources from advertiSing must nearly
be extinct, thus precluding a circulation size of any significance. As a
23 394 U.S. at 136.
34 Roberts, supra note 1, at 351.
65 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
Se 394 U.S. at 138.
27 E.g., Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943); United States v.
Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958).
93 394 U.S. at 136-38.
89
 Although writers, editors, printers and other employees might be considered in-
ventory, they are probably not strong selling points for a newspaper since the human
element involved presents a good deal of uncertainty to the prospective buyer. He is not
familiar with these personnel, and he can not even be assured that they will remain with
the paper once it is sold.
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result, a newspaper would only have its mechanical equipment to offer
and little else.
III. THE NEWSPAPER PRESERVATION ACT
The Newspaper Preservation Act was enacted as a legislative
response to the ruling in Citizens Publishing Co. in the public interest
of maintaining editorial and reportorial independence and competi-
tion." The Act declares that it is the public policy of the United States
to preserve existing and future joint newspaper operating arrange-
ments41 entered into in accordance with its provisions. To this end,
Section 4(a) 42 grants an antitrust exemption to joint arrangements
4° The Act states:
Sec. 2. In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially
and reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the United States,
it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the United States to preserve the
publication of newspapers in any city, community, or metropolitan area where
a joint operating arrangement has been heretofore entered into because of eco-
nomic distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2501.
41 A joint newspaper operating arrangement is defined as follows:
(2) The term "joint newspaper operating arrangement" means any contract,
agreement, joint venture (whether or not incorporated), or other arrangement
entered into by two or more newspaper owners for the publication of two or
more newspaper publications, pursuant to which joint or common production
facilities are established or operated and joint or unified action is taken or
agreed to be taken with respect to any one or more of the following: printing;
time, method, and field of publication; allocation of production facilities; distri-
bution; advertising solicitation; circulation solicitation; business department;
establishment of advertising rates; establishment of circulation rates and revenue
distribution: Provided, That there is no merger, combination, or amalgamation
of editorial or reportorial staffs, and that editorial policies be independently
determined.
Section 3 of the Act continues by defining other relevant terms:
(3) The term "newspaper owner" means any person who owns or controls
directly, or indirectly through separate or subsidary (sic) corporations, one or
more newspaper publications.
(4) The term "newspaper publication" means a publication produced on
newsprint paper which is published in one or more issues weekly (including as
one publication any daily newspaper and any Sunday newspaper published by
the same owner in the same city, community, or metropolitan area), and in
which a substantial portion of the content is devoted to the dissemination of
news and editorial opinion.
. • . .
(6) The term "person" means any individual, and any partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity existing under or authorized by the
law of the United States, any State or possession of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign
country.
Id. at 2501-502.
42 Sec. 4. (a) It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law for any person
to perform, enforce, renew, or amend any joint newspaper operating arrange-
ment entered into prior to the effective date of this Act, if at the time at which
ouch arrangement was first entered into, regardless of ownership or affiliations,
not more than one of the newspaper publications involved in the performance
943
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existing prior to the effective date of the Act if at the time the agree-
ment was made only one of the newspapers involved "was likely to re-
main or become a financially sound publication." The reason f or this is
obvious—if competitors were likely to remain financially stable on an
independent basis, then the need for a joint operating arrangement
would not exist. It is reasonable to conclude that two "financially
sound" papers would only desire to merge to achieve a monopolistic
position. Such a situation would defeat the purpose of the Newspaper
Preservation Act which is to preserve editorial competition otherwise
precluded by "economic distress."
Section 4(b)" of the Act applies the antitrust exemption to joint
arrangements created after the effective date of the Act. These pro-
spective arrangements must obtain the prior written consent of the
Attorney General of the United States before they will be given the
benefit of the exemption. In considering the application for consent,
the Attorney General must determine that not more than one of the
newspaper publications involved is other than a "failing newspaper,"
and that the arrangement will effectuate the policy and purpose of the
Act. In this regard, the Act defines a "failing newspaper" as "a news-
paper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is
in probable danger of financial failure."" (Emphasis added.) This
definition amends the "failing company" requirement of the hopeless
insolvency of the acquired company—a requisite which, as has been
shown above, fails to acknowledge the economic and market realities
of the newspaper industry. The "failing newspaper" definition provides
a flexible test for the courts to determine whether a newspaper is
failing. The factors to be considered in making such an evaluation
will vary with each individual situation," thereby enabling the court
of such arrangement was likely to remain or become a financially sound publi-
cation: Provided, That the terms of a renewal or amendment to a joint operating
arrangement must be filed with the Department of Justice and that the amend-
ment does not add a newspaper publication or newspaper publications to such
arrangement.
Id. at 2502.
43 Section 4(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to enter into, perform, or enforce a
joint operating arrangement, not already in effect, except with the prior written
consent of the Attorney General of the United States. Prior to granting such
approval, the Attorney General shall determine that not more than one of the
newspaper publications involved in the arrangement is a publication other than
a failing newspaper, and that approval of such arrangement would effectuate the
policy and purpose of this Act.
Id. at 2502.
44 This quote is from 1 3(5) which states in full: "The term 'failing newspaper'
means a newspaper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, is in
probable danger of financial failure." Id.
45 suggested factors include:
first, net loss or declining net income; second, whether accounting ratios [show]
instability . . . ;
• • • •
Third, declining circulation trends; fourth, increasing cost trends, including
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to recognize a paper's trend toward failure before that trend becomes
irreversible.
The joint operating arrangement is treated as a full merger and,
as an entity, is subject to the same antitrust prohibitions as one owner
situations." This provision is of importance to newspapers which must
compete with joint arrangements. The Act assures them of a cause of
action in the event of anti-competitive practices by the members of
the arrangement. Section 4(c) 47 provides that the antitrust exemption
does not include predatory pricing, predatory practices, or "other
conduct . . . which would be unlawful under any Antitrust Law if
engaged in by a single entity." The Act further provides, in Section
5(a)," that the parties to the joint arrangement in Tucson, Arizona,
may reinstitute that agreement notwithstanding the ruling in Citizens
Publishing Co., and Section 5 (b)" declares that the Act is retroactive
and shall apply to the determination of any civil or criminal antitrust
action pending in any district court of the United States on the date
of enactment wherein it is alleged that a joint newspaper arrangement
is unlawful under any antitrust law.
operational costs, circulation and subscription costs and solicitation costs;
fifth, increasing advertising rates without corresponding increases in income;
sixth, declining trends in the percentage of newspaper columns used for adver-
tising purposes; seventh, factors showing strengthening of a competitor, includ-
ing his increased circulation and advertising trends; eighth, price war conditions,
promotional activities and premiums used as a means to maintain circulation or
advertising, demonstrating inherent instability; ninth, instability and insecurity
of personnel . • . ; tenth, the extent of investments required in fixed assets,
equipment, and machinery; eleventh, demands on capital apart from newspaper
operations; twelfth, adverse legal developments; and thirteenth, basic insta-
bility shown by the necessity of reliance upon the financial strength of stock-
holders or the financial capacity and operations of parent companies or other
related newspaper publications rather than on the inherent strength of the paper
itself.
116 Cong. Rec. S865 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1970) (remarks of Senator Bennett).
40 This point is made in Section 4(c) of the Act which states:
Nothing contained in the Act shall be construed to exempt from any anti-
trust Iaw any predatory pricing, any predatory practice, or any other conduct in
the otherwise lawful operations of a joint newspaper operating arrangement
which would be unlawful under any antitrust taw if engaged in by a single
entity. Except as provided in this Act, no joint newspaper operating arrange-
ment or any party thereto shall be exempt from any antitrust law.
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2502.
47 Id.
48 Sec. 5. (a) Notwithstanding any final judgment rendered in any action
brought by the United States under which a joint operating arrangement has
been held to be unlawful under any antitrust law, any party to such final judg-
ment may reinstitute said joint newspaper operating arrangement to the extent
permissible under section 4(a) hereof.
Id. at 2502.
40 Sec. 5. . . . (b) The provisions of section 4 shall apply to the determina-
tion of any civil or criminal action pending in any district court of the United
States on the date of enactment of this Act in which it is alleged that any such
joint operating agreement is unlawful under any antitrust law.
Id. at 2503.
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The antitrust exemption provided by the* Act can be justified on
the grounds of public policy. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, there are mergers which should be
upheld because of "countervailing competitive, economic, or social
advantages." 50
 Although commercial competition among newspapers
is desirable since it promotes efficiency within the industry, it is not
as important as the absolute necessity that they compete editorially
and reportorially. As Justice Black has pointed out, the First Amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of the press "rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, [in] that
a free press is a condition of a free society."" Unfortunately, the normal
market forces operating within the newspaper industry usually pre-
clude commercial competition and, in the absence of limited antitrust
exemption, editorial competition as well. Thus, the public interest in
the preservation of editorial and reportorial independence and com-
petition warrants this exemption from antitrust laws. Such legislative
antitrust exemption is not new, and is generally based upon the premise
that in certain areas national interest or policy should take precedence
over antitrust policy."
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Although the exemption which the Newspaper Preservation Act
provides is warranted, constitutional issues are presented which will
undoubtedly become the basis for legal actions challenging the validity
of the Act. Since the statute is retroactive," it represents a legislative
destruction of vested and pending causes of action, thus raising the
issue of possible deprivation of property without due process of the
law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. However, the Supreme Court
does not give much weight to the fact that a cause of action is pending
in litigation" or has been reduced to judgment." Several cases have
raised the question of whether incurring financial liability due to the
retroactivity of a statute should be considered such a change of position
so 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962).
51 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The importance of
diverse, quarrelsome and competitive editorial voices was highlighted in a political science
study of the structure of the local government in Dade County (Miami), Florida, which
concluded that a candidate for county office by virtue of support from both the Miami
Herald and its competitor the Miami News, could guarantee himself a victory. Roberts,
supra note 1, at 322.
52
 Examples of other legislative antitrust exemptions include: exemptions allowing
farmers to join together in cooperative associations [15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964)]; a labor
policy exempting collective bargaining (29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1964)]; exemptions to
export associations of domestic competitors for the purpose of engaging In foreign trade
[15 ¢.61-65 (1964)); exemptions for a limited time to the insurance industry
[15 U.S.C. § 1011-015 (1964)].
53
 Section 5 of the Act declares its retroactivity; see notes 48 and 49 supra.
64
 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
65
 Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947).
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in reliance on the law as to constitute a violation of due process."
However, in all of them the Supreme Court held that the retroactive
statute was not contrary to the requirements of due process. Apparently,
the Court believed that the expenses and changes of position involved
provided an insufficient basis from which to attack the constitutionality
of an otherwise valid statute." In determining the constitutionality of
federal legislation in light of the due process clause, the Supreme
Court has recognized that although there are objections to retroactive
statutes, the nature and strength of the public interest served may
make retroactivity desirable in a particular case." Thus, the Court has
consistently held that not all retroactive statutes are unconstitutional,
but only those believed to be unreasonable." That the public interest
is well served by diverse and independent editorial voices needs no
further discussion. The importance of the competition of ideas is well
documented in books, journals and court decisions. However, the im-
mediacy and severity of declining competition among newspapers
threatens this public interest, and if the congressional remedy is to
meet the problem it must not only be prospective, but able to reach
back as well to pending litigation wherein it is alleged that a joint
newspaper arrangement is unlawful under antitrust law. It is unreason-
able to deny certain joint newspaper operating arrangements the anti-
trust exemption of the Newspaper Preservation Act simply because an
action was instituted against them prior to the effective date of the
Act. This would be no more than precluding editorial competition to
satisfy a right which no longer exists.
A second constitutional issue is presented by the fact that the Act
ostensibly applies a stricter standard to joint arrangements created
after the effective date of the Act.°° This is arguably contrary to the
guarantee of equal protection of the law. To ,comply with the statute,
future arrangements must have the prior written approval of the
Attorney General, whereas existing arrangements are not so bound.
However, the Constitution only requires that any disparity in treat-
ment caused by such classifications be reasonable." In this regard, a
presumption in favor of the reasonableness is recognized by the Court
if any state of facts can be conceived that would justify the ciassifica-
tion.°2 The record seems to provide a sufficient justification. While con-
ducting hearings on the Newspaper Preservation Act, the House Anti-
trust Subcommittee requested all of the 22 existing joint newspaper
56 E.g., League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902); United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206
U.S. 370 (1907); Graham and Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931).
57 282 U.S. at 428,
58 See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), and League v. Texas,
184 U.S. 156 (1902).
59 Id.
00 The Newspaper Preservation Act was made law on July 24, 1970. 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2501-503.
01 Cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
62 Id.
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operating arrangements to furnish extensive contractual and financial
data.0
 All of the participants complied with the request. The subcom-
mittee used this information to understand the nature and characteris-
tics of joint operating arrangements. The data was also used as a guide
in molding the provisions of the Newspaper Preservation Act. Since it
is now public knowledge that in each of the 22 existing arrangements no
more than one of the parties involved was "likely to remain or become
a financially sound publication" at the inception of the agreement, and
since congressional investigation has shown that the agreements com-
port with the purpose and policy of the Act, it is unreasonable to sub-
ject these arrangements to a redetermination of these facts by the
Attorney General. Thus, it is submitted that the disparity of treatment
between joint arrangements existing prior to enactment of the News-
paper Preservation Act and those subsequently created is reasonable
and, therefore, constitutional.
Since the Act sanctions the use of combination advertising rates
by joint arrangements," the question arises whether this preempts
advertising revenue otherwise available to newspapers not party to the
arrangement, in violation of the equal protection and due process
guarantees. To effect such a preemption, the members of the joint
arrangement would have to compel advertisers to purchase space in all
of its papers, thereby discouraging or disenabling advertisers from
purchasing space in non-member papers. This is most, effectively ac-
complished by using disprOportionate combination advertising rates.
For example, if a joint arrangement charges $1.25 per line for adver-
tising in its morning paper, $1.25 per line for its evening paper, and a
combination rate of only $1.40 per line to advertise in both papers,
advertisers are compelled, as a practical matter, to take advantage of
the latter rate. Such disproportionate rates do not reflect newspaper
costs, but rather indicate an attempt to preclude advertisers from using
only one of the papers. The ultimate effect would be to preclude adver-
63 This information included:
(1) copies of all contractual documents among the parties that define the struc-
ture and scope of activities in the joint operating arrangement; and (2) in-
formation that will reflect the financial condition of the parties at the time the
joint arrangement was entered into, and comparable information for the last
three operating years.
The financial information requested includes balance sheets and detailed
profit and loss income statements for the newspapers involved.
The information was to be certified by a responsible officer of the publisher and a re-
quest was made by the subcommittee that the reports be audited by a Certified Public
Accountant. 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2930-931.
64 This sanction is found in the definition of a "joint operating arrangement" as
found in § 3(2) of the Act, note 41 supra. Generally a joint newspaper operating ar-
rangement is entered into by a morning and an evening paper. The arrangement offers
a rate to advertisers for each paper individually, and additionally, offers a single rate
for advertising in both papers at a nominal saving to the advertiser. This latter rate is
referred to as a "combination rate." For example, if the arrangement charged adver-
tisers $1.25 per line to advertise in the morning paper and $1.25 per line for the evening
paper, a combination rate of $2.30 might be legally charged to advertise in both papers.
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tisers from using papers not party to the arrangement. This exclusionary
tactic is not tolerated by the Act wherein Section 4 (c) prohibits
predatory pricing and predatory practices by joint arrangements.
Reasonable combination advertising rates which reflect publishing
costs are permitted. They are not exclusionary since they only offer
small savings and, thus, do not discourage advertisers from considering
other newspapers.
Although the Act adequately prohibits exclusionary and other
illicit conduct by joint arrangements against other competing news-
papers, the question has been raised whether it precludes the entry of
new publications or inhibits the development of newly created papers.
In Bay Guardian v. Chronicle Publishing Co.," presently lis pendens,
and the first constitutional challenge to the Newspaper Preservation
Act, a monthly news and editorial publication alleged that it was un-
constitutionally precluded by the Act from competing with the parties
to a San Francisco joint newspaper operating arrangement. The plain-
tiff publication argued that from its inception it has been unable to
achieve its goal of daily publication due to a lack of revenue caused by
advertisers' attraction to the combination rates offered by the arrange-
ment and the unfair advantage of combined distribution efficiencies. If
editorial competition is a matter of public interest and national policy,
the monthly publication insisted, then the Newspaper Preservation
Act is unconstitutional since it defeats that policy by permitting activity
which precludes competition in violation of the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press. This argument is based upon the
premise that economic and market forces will naturally sustain com-
petition between completely independent newspapers. However, with
the exception of a very few cities, this is not true. A case in point is
that of the New York Daily Mirror, published in New York City. The
Mirror, while practically identical to its competitor, the New York
Daily News, retained the second largest circulation size in the country,
but died for lack of advertisers." The Mirror fell victim to natural
market forces, not unfair competitive practices. The Newspaper Pres-
ervation Act does not sanction activity which precludes competition,
rather it sustains competition in situations where it otherwise could
not exist. The Act not only protects against illicit conduct by joint
newspaper operating arrangements, it also guards against collusive
intent in the creation of the arrangement—situations where successful
and competing newspapers desire the benefits of a joint operating
arrangement and agree that one of the publications should intentionally
"fail" in order to meet the requirements of the Act. Such a conspiracy
is contrary to the policy and purpose of the statute, and is merely an
00 C-70-1613-GSL (ND. Cal., filed July 30, 1970),
06 Statement of Dr. Harry Kelber, Professor of Social Sciences at the New York
Institute of Technology, Hearings on S.1312. Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 938
(1967). [hereinafter cited as hearings on S. 1312].
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attempt at monopoly in a market which is conducive to newspaper
competition. Section 4(b) requires the Attorney General to investigate
prospective joint agreements to insure that they will effectuate the
policy and purpose of the Act. If this inquiry reveals collusive activity,
then his consent to the joint agreement will not be given. Thus, it is
submitted that the Act provides an adequate safeguard to insure that
jointly operated newspapers cannot, by virtue of that arrangement,
engage in unfair practices detrimental to other papers.
The statute also requires that editorial policies of the parties to a
joint arrangement be independently" determined, and Section 4(b) 48
contemplates that the Attorney General will promulgate such regula-
tions as are appropriate for the discharge of his responsibility to effec-
tuate the policy and purposes of the Act. It is necessary to inquire
whether this authorizes governmental inquiry into the process by which
editorial policies are determined in violation of the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press." It is generally understood that
freedom of the press is not an absolute right. In Fleming v. Lowell Sun
Co.," a newspaper was required to produce books, records, documents
and papers in connection with an investigation by the Department of
Labor. The federal district court held that the newspaper industry is
not immune from government regulation of incidents of the business
that do not restrict its freedom to publish. The issue, then, is whether
the Act imposes a "prior restraint" upon publication. In this regard,
the statute does not authorize the Attorney General to make inquiry
into the manner in which editorial policies are determined, but rather,
the manner in which editorial departments are kept independent of one
another, that is, an investigation of the organizational structure of the
joint operation. Thus, it is submitted that such authorized inquiry and
regulation involve the incidents of the newspaper business and do not
impose a prior restraint upon publication.
V. INADEQUACY OF THE ACT—AND AN ALTERNATIVE
Although the Newspaper Preservation Act acknowledges the dan-
gers inherent in declining newspaper competition, it does not adequately
meet the problem it was intended to alleviate. The statute is merely an
attempt to sustain existing competition without attacking the economic
forces" creating the concentration of power in the newspaper industry.
Since too few cities enjoy editorial and reportorial competition today, 72
07 This declaration is found in § 3(2), note 41 supra.
es See note 43 supra.
22 This argument was raised in the Brief for Plaintiff at 27-28, Bay Guardian v.
Chronicle Publishing Co., note 65 supra.
70 36 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1940).
n See note "2 supra for an enumeration of the basic economic forces involved.
72 EDiespite the vital task that in our society the press performs, the number of
daily newspapers in the United States is at its lowest point since the century's
turn: in 1951. 1,773 daily newspapers served 1,443 American cities, compared
with 2,600 dailies published in 1,207 cities in 1909. Moreover, while 598 new
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the public interest is little served by maintaining the present com-
petitive level. Making it easier for newspapers to enter into the field
of active competition is the only proper means of rectifying the situation
and satisfying the real need—an increase in competition.
To effectuate the desired "ease of entry" into the newspaper
industry, potential entrants need more than a printing press and an
initial investment. They need an assurance that the market will be able
to support them and not preclude access to a source of revenue. The
present economic realities of the newspaper industry require that
advertising be that source.
[A] newspaper's economic strength depends largely on its
advertising revenues, which in turn depend on readership.
Since readership depends on content, which includes adver-
tising as well as news matter, the process is almost a vicious
cycle: a drop in advertising dollars means a drop in money
that can be spent for promotion and editorial content, which
leads in turn to a drop in circulation, which leads to a further
drop in advertising, and so forth."
In other industries, a new corporation begins as a small entity receiving
revenue from the sale of its product. With this money it is able to
improve, grow and become successful. If its earnings should prove
insufficient for survival, then the corporation may change its product,
market, or both to regain financial stability. In any event, its success
or failure is the result of its own efforts. But the newpaper industry
faces a different situation. Its source of financial livelihood accrues
from the sale of advertising space, not the sale of its product. A news-
paper needs revenue to develop into a successful publication and, there-
fore, must turn to advertisers for support. Advertisers, however, are
attracted to large circulation size. Thus, a newspaper cannot afford to
begin as a small entity. If it is to survive, it must enter the market with
an impressive circulation. In short, a newspaper must begin as a success
to appeal to advertisers who control the financial destiny of the
industry.
Consequently, in order to increase newspaper competition, legisla-
tion is required which will mitigate reliance upon advertising as the
"staff of life." It is submitted that a progressive tax on newspaper
dailies braved the field between 1929 and 1950, 373 of these suspended publica-
tion during that period—less than half of the new entrants survived. Concur-
rently, daily newspaper competition within individual cities has grown nearly
extinct: in 1951, 81% of all daily newspaper cities had only one daily newspaper;
11% more had 2 or more publications, but a single publisher controlled both
or all. In that year, therefore, only 8% of daily newspaper cities enjoyed the
clash of opinion which competition among publishers of their daily press could
provide.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953). See also note
1 supra which indicates this trend has continued to the present time.
la Statement of Thurston Twigg-Smith, President and Publisher of the Honolulu
Advertiser, Hearings on S.I312, supra note 66, at 613.
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advertising revenue would have such an effect." By raising the tax
rate on each dollar of advertising revenue above an established marginal
rate, the financial return to the paper would decrease as advertising
sales increased. Using arbitrary figures to demonstrate this-point, the
tax rate might be 15 percent for the first $10,000 of advertising revenue,
60 percent for additional revenue up to $60,000, and 80 percent on all
revenue above $60,000. Thus, if a newspaper earned $100,000 of
advertising revenue in a tax year, the publication's return would be
$36,500 after taxes were applied at the progressive rate, whereas under
the existing tax schedule the paper would be left with $58,500." If
advertising played a smaller supportive role, more newspaper opera-
tional costs would have to be passed on to the reading public. This
raises the danger that increased newspaper cost will discourage the
public and cause them to turn exclusively to television and radio for
their news. However, as one authority has pointed out, these other
media are primarily entertainment oriented and cannot give the lasting
or in-depth news coverage which newspapers provide." Further, it is
submitted that since a progressive tax on advertising revenue would
encourage and enable new publications to engage in competition in the
various metropolitan areas, a new field would be opened to private
enterprise wherein fewer newspaper costs would have to be passed on
to the public. Increased newspaper competition would present a lucra-
tive opportunity for the creation of an industry to handle the printing
requirements of all newspapers within each metropolitan area. Since
these firms would specialize in volume printing, it is reasonable to
expect that they would invest in research to devise more efficient and
inexpensive printing techniques. This would represent a cost saving to
the newspapers, and, therefore, reduce the costs that would be passed
on to the public. Thus, it seems doubtful that an increased newspaper
cost will substantially affect newspaper sales. And in this way, a more
equitable basis for competition would evolve. Newspapers would
financially depend upon, and have to appeal to, readers who could be
74 Although many authorities have considered the use of taxes to impede declining
competition in the newspaper industry—e.g., 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Com-
munications 697 (1947)—the suggestion for a progressive tax on newspaper advertising
revenue has been made by Richard Barber. See Barber, Newspaper Monopoly in New
Orleans: The Lesson for Antitrust Policy, 24 La. L. Rev. 503, 553.
75 These figures are intended merely to provide an example of how a progressive
tax would operate, and should not be construed as a recommendation for the actual
amounts to be used in a progressive scale. These figures could only be determined after
in-depth government research on the question. The tax figure at the progressive rate was
computed as follows: 15% of $10,000 which equals $1,500; 60% of $50,000 which equals
$30,000; 80% of $40,000 which equals $32,000; the total of these amounts is $63,500.
Deducting this from $100,000, the paper is Left with $36,500 (exclusive of the normal
surtax rate). The tax figure at the existing rate was computed in accordance with the
Internal Revenue Code as follows: 22% of $100,000 which equals $22,000, plus a surtax
of 26% of $75,000 which equals $19,500. The total tax is $41,500 and the newspaper is
left with $58,500. ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 11.
70
 Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 319,
320-21 (1968).
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attracted by a change in the product, instead of advertisers who could
not. While the policy of objectively presenting news would continue to
strike a note of similarity among publications, other aspects of news-
paper content could be effectively used by publishers to distinguish
competing papers.
The implementation of a progressive tax program would necessi-
tate a modification of the Newspaper Preservation Act. Since the sug-
gested tax on advertising revenue would cause publications to become
more public oriented and pass more of their operating costs on to the
readers, the parties to a joint newspaper operating arrangement would
enjoy a production cost advantage over their non-member competitors
which would no longer be justified by uncontrollable market forces.
Thus, joint-arrangement newspapers could offer a quality product at
a lower cost to the public. To avoid the inequities of this situation, the
Newspaper Preservation Act would have to be modified to require all
joint newspaper operating arrangements to admit their non-member
competitors to the joint agreement. In this way, the primary purpose of
the joint arrangement would no longer be to generate revenue for
failing publications, but rather to reduce costs in order to alleviate
some of the burden which the public would have to bear. Thus, the
need for a joint advertising department and combination advertising
rates would no longer be necessary.
A progressive tax on newspaper advertising revenue would be
consistent with the First Amendment right to freedom of the press. It
would not act as a prior restraint on publication, rather, it would
merely mitigate the industry's emphasis on one source of revenue in
order to effectuate public policy of paramount importance. Further,
the Supreme Court has implied that a tax on newspaper advertising is
valid and does not necessarily limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled." In short, a progressive tax would con-
stitute a direct attack upon the economic and market forces that are
responsible for declining competition in the newspaper industry. By
removing the obstacle which dependence on advertising revenue creates,
and thereby providing a more equitable basis for competition, the
present mortality rate within the industry should decline. In addition,
potential entrants would be encouraged to engage in competition since
they would not be denied revenue by forces beyond their control.
CONCLUSION
The Newspaper Preservation Act indicates congressional aware-
ness of a problem within the newspaper industry—a problem that
77 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In this case, a state license
tax imposed on owners of newspapers for the privilege of charging for advertising, and
measured by a percentage of gross receipts from such advertising, but applicable only to
newspapers with a circulation of 20,000 or more per week, was held unconstitutional as
limiting the circulation of information to which the public is entitled. However, the
thrust of the Court's objection was that the tax was not measured or limited by the
value of advertising. The tax was measured alone by the circulation of the publication in
which the advertising appeared.
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threatens the competition of ideas in our society. Because of the dual
competitive nature of newspapers, antitrust surveillance can only ag-
gravate an already troubled situation. However, this legislation, provid-
ing limited antitrust exemption, can only slow down the anti-competi-
tive trend; it cannot eliminate it. This is because the Act does not
recognize or counter the adverse effect which reliance upon advertising
revenue has on newspaper competition.
A progressive tax on newspaper advertising revenue would reduce
the industry's reliance on advertising as a source of financial livelihood.
As a result, newspapers would have to become public oriented. News-
papers would have to pass off more of their operating costs to the public
by raising the price per issue. This, however, should not adversely
affect sales, and would have the beneficial effect of providing a more
equitable basis for competition, and thereby encourage new membership
in the industry. However, until legislation is passed which will strike
at the cause of decline, the Newspaper Preservation Act is an adequate
compromise to maintain the present level of competition and assure
continued diversity of opinion to that portion of the public which
presently receives it.
THOMAS E. HUMPHREY
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